

**USAID/Somalia**  
**Operational Plan**

**FY 2006**

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## **Please Note:**

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Related document information can be obtained from:  
USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse  
8403 Colesville Road, Suite 210  
Silver Spring, MD 20910  
Telephone: (301) 562-0641  
Fax: (301) 588-7787  
Email: [docorder@dec.cdie.org](mailto:docorder@dec.cdie.org)  
Internet: <http://www.dec.org>

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## **Program Performance Summary FY 2005: A. Program Performance Summary**

### **Program Narrative (FY 2005):**

Somalia has been without a central government since 1991, and after numerous failed attempts at state-building, the 2004 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-led peace process in Kenya achieved a breakthrough by endorsing a five-year interim Transitional Federal Government (TFG). President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was elected in October 2004 and he appointed Ali Mohamed Ghedi as Prime Minister. The President, Prime Minister and MPs reflect a delicate balance of representatives across most clans and sub-clans. Given this balance among competing and mutually suspicious groups, the current situation is extremely fragile and sharp divisions have emerged within the TFG that threaten to destroy the nascent process. The apparent main point of contention is the location of the seat of the new government, but there is also controversy over a national security and stabilization plan and a national reconciliation plan.

During the 1990s Somalia slipped down the list of UNDPs Global Human Development Index of least developed countries from 123 to 172 out of 174; it has not been ranked since 1997 because the destruction and looting of nearly all infrastructure during the civil war made statistical data inadequate. Somalia has been the site of continuous humanitarian operations since 1990. Even in years of good rainfall, strong harvests and reduced conflict, the country is chronically vulnerable to epidemics and food shortfalls. The social costs of war and 14 years without governance have been enormous. Somalia's human development indicators are among the lowest in the world. Life expectancy is 47 years; the mortality rate for children under five is 224 per 1,000; primary school enrollment is less than 20 percent; and GNP per capita is \$226. Chronic food insecurity and extraordinarily high malnutrition levels persist throughout the country, even in populations that are relatively food secure. Currently, around a quarter of the "under-five" population is experiencing levels of acute overall malnutrition and in parts of Gedo and Juba regions malnutrition rates are above 20 percent.

While most of south-central Somalia displays high levels of criminality, sporadic armed conflict, lack of economic recovery, and population displacement, most of northern Somalia, by contrast, has experienced impressive political development and economic recovery, with substantial return and investment from the diaspora. The most successful of these regions is Somaliland which has completed a formal transition to elective democracy and now has in place a constitution that was overwhelmingly approved by popular referendum, democratically elected municipal governments, a president, and a parliament. Puntland has also made progress in peace and development and is in the process of moving towards local council elections. The impressive achievements of Somaliland and Puntland in ending conflict, professionalizing their security forces, removing weapons from public places, and moving ahead with democratization demonstrate that Somalis are capable of drawing on positive sources of resilience, making peace and turning to positive politics and business. These successes, albeit limited geographically could serve as a foundation and example for similar accomplishments elsewhere in the country.

US national interests are clear: stability and security will not be achieved in the greater Horn of Africa region without putting an end to conflict and Somali support for extremism and terrorism. The paramount goal of US policy is to encourage the return of Somalia to the international community as a legitimate and reliable member that will not serve as a harbor for terrorism. The US and donor partners provide an alternative to extremism in Somalia through humanitarian assistance and support for long-term economic, social and democratic development, but these contributions are modest compared to the overwhelming needs.

**Donor Relations:** The international community agreed in Stockholm in October 2004 that the UN should lead coordination and cooperation of the international community with respect to Somalia and with the TFG. A Declaration of Principles was approved and a Coordination and Monitoring Committee (CMC) was established. In addition, the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB), founded in the mid 1990s, continues to meet and address donor specific issues. It is envisioned that the SACB and CMC structures will merge, although a separate entity for coordination with Somaliland will need to be crafted. USAID will continue to be an active participant within the CMC and SACB and to provide support to the Secretariat serving both.

At the request of the TFG and the international community, the United Nations and the World Bank have launched a Somali Joint Needs Assessment (JNA), in partnership with Somali counterparts. The JNA is currently underway and will lead to a Reconstruction and Development Program aimed at serving as a platform for Somali authorities and the international community to discuss and agree on priorities for support over the coming five years. The JNA is expected to lead to a donor's conference to be held in 2006 in Europe.

**Challenges:** The current TFG split reflects deep and enduring fault-lines that were not properly addressed during the Nairobi peace talks in 2004. Friction between the leaders of the transitional federal institutions is exacerbated by their refusal to meet face-to-face, with the president and prime minister based in Jowhar, and the speaker of parliament and ministers based in Mogadishu. If the TFG were to move towards national unity, its biggest challenge will be establishment of its legitimacy, acceptance, and capacity to provide security and governance throughout Somalia. The TFG will need to carefully balance authority and power dynamics with regard to the regions of Puntland and Somaliland as well as bring into the fold various opposition leaders and potential spoilers. The TFG is faced with enormous hurdles and it remains to be seen whether this latest experience in government reestablishment will succeed.

International efforts to restore central government to Somalia have generally been high-level, extraterritorial affairs, and "peace-building" on the ground has largely been left to Somali civic and traditional leaders with limited linkage to the high-level efforts. Decisions about control of economic infrastructure such as ports and airports, and the sharing of revenues between central and local governments are potentially explosive. Other issues such as demobilization and reintegration of militia and ex-combatants may be less politically charged but will require collaboration between state and local leadership.

There continues to be a disturbing build-up in militia firepower and recruitment. This increased militarization of both sides results in a severely elevated threat of widespread violence in Somalia. An outbreak of armed conflict will have direct and widespread negative implications on food and livelihood security, one that may easily lead Somalia into a humanitarian crisis of the proportions experienced ten years ago that hit television screens across the world. This is compounded by the huge spate of piracy along the Somali coast that is restricting delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The declining export earnings following a livestock ban imposed in September 2000 by countries in the Arabian Peninsula because of inadequate animal health control systems and certification procedures remains a concern. This has particularly affected the nomadic pastoral population that makes up approximately 44 percent of the Somali population. Another concern is the severe environmental degradation resulting from the combined effects of poverty and post-war breakdown of natural resource management that continues to dramatically undermine food security. While there are many cases of environmental degradation (e.g., fishing exploitation, water contamination, etc.), charcoal production (especially for export) is of particular concern due to the widespread deforestation of the main livestock fodder tree.

#### P.L. 480 Title II Program

PL 480 food resources make up the bulk of USAID's program in Somalia and contribute to USAID's objective for improved infrastructure for productive services as well as USAID's objective to target food aid at vulnerable groups. The majority of food assistance is targeted at the drought-affected population, where an estimated one million people are food insecure due to several consecutive years of drought and failed harvests, as well as continued conflict and displacement. CARE and WFP are our Title II implementing partners.

**Key Achievements:** The FY 2005 USAID Somalia program recorded important achievements, despite an increasingly insecure environment that prohibited access to much of the country.

1) Strengthened Civil Society: USAID continued to achieve impressive results through its support to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to improve institutional capacity and deliver services to selected communities, although modest funding enabled only program implementation in Somaliland. USAID met its targets through strengthening ten Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to better contribute to good governance in Somaliland by improving their institutional capacity and ability to deliver essential services to selected communities in collaboration with local authorities. Through the provision of sub-grants to eight CSOs, USAID improved maternal health and child survival in four communities in Awdal, Sahil and Togdheer regions of Somaliland. USAID influenced policy change through support to two umbrella organizations focused on public advocacy for greater democratic space and participation by women in the political arena and also focused on spearheading a campaign for the adoption of an NGO code of conduct by parliament. Through support to political party development in Somaliland, USAID contributed to successful parliamentary elections and enhanced the democratization process. USAID improved community-based reconciliation efforts throughout Somalia by supporting a multi-donor effort that engaged a broad cross-section of Somali people in public discussion and a range of conflict mitigation initiatives.

2) Productive Livelihoods: This objective focused on basic education, urban water rehabilitation and developing alternative and renewable energy. Fifteen schools were rehabilitated, increasing enrollment by 648 students; and scholarships were provided to nineteen girls from three different regions of Somaliland to attend a teacher education college. School rehabilitation, coupled with water and health interventions were conducted in targeted communities, with the focus of encouraging parents to send girls to school, and the scholarship recipients to return to their respective communities to teach. A four-and-a-half year urban water project that increased access to potable water for some 250,000 people was completed along with a study of alternate water sources for Hargeisa city that provided the Somaliland authorities with viable options for future water supply. To stimulate economic diversification, USAID promoted access to alternative and renewable energy technologies as well as safe, efficient use of conventional energy sources in northern Somalia. USAID support to marketing and technical services in the energy sector led to a total of \$406,290 invested privately in the renewable energy sector, including \$250,000 that was invested in the set up of a wind pump manufacturing plant in Hargeisa, Somaliland. These activities have stimulated investment, increased human resource capacity, and strengthened and developed local structures to manage and support both alternative and conventional energy resources.

3) Humanitarian Assistance: USAID provided curative care including health education and monitoring in high-risk cholera outbreak zones which contributed to the prevention of an outbreak for the first time in ten years. USAID provided malnourished children with life-saving emergency nutritional support in areas acutely affected by chronic food insecurity, drought and conflict. Nutritional surveillance was strengthened through ongoing training and support at 150 health facilities throughout Somalia that led to better targeting of vulnerable groups. Through the rehabilitation of water supply systems, USAID provided 456,500 people in 177 rural communities in central and southern Somalia increased access to potable water. USAID supported the provision of emergency vaccinations to children under-five years of age to prevent the transmission of communicable childhood diseases. USAID improved the quality and availability of health care services by ensuring the timely delivery of essential drugs to maternal and child health centers; eighty nine percent of targeted health workers received drugs on time.

Gender: Women are the focal point of provision of services to households, especially in times of conflict and crisis. Somali clan structure and practice often relegates women to a minor role in community deliberations about resources when nearly all policymakers and decision-makers may be men. This is an important constraint to effective design and implementation of development programs but also affects the delivery of emergency and humanitarian relief, especially where the targeted beneficiaries are women and children.

USAID addressed gender concerns in its institutional strengthening to ensure that CSOs are gender-sensitive in their internal organization and operation, and secondly, that CSOs programs are gender sensitive, have a positive impact on both genders, do no harm to any gender, and do not reinforce institutionalized gender-biased practices. USAID Somalia employed the following approaches to improve gender integration during institutional development for CSOs: targeting civil society organizations

representing the interests of women, promoting women in leadership positions, and encouraging gender balance in positions of decision making. USAID provided CSOs with technical support in developing and implementing gender-sensitive programs, including M&E frameworks. USAID's education program has a special emphasis on increasing opportunities for Somali girls and humanitarian assistance targets Somalis most vulnerable, which includes women and girls.

**FY 2006 Program**  
**SO: 649-007 Reinforce Conflict-Mitigation Capacity**

**Mitigate Conflict and Support Peace**

Mitigate Conflict and Support Peace (\$100,000 DA). USAID will provide funds to support the United Nation's multi-donor Somalia Coordination Secretariat which facilitates the development of policy and operational coordination for peace, reconciliation, and development activities. Support includes modalities to work with the emerging transitional government institutions. Principal contractors and grantees: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (prime).

**Strengthen Civil Society**

Strengthen Civil Society (\$1,000,000 DA). USAID will reinforce the capacity of Somali civil society to provide basic social services as a means of promoting peace and mitigating conflict. Workshops and other events to encourage local communities to peacefully resolve problems rather than resorting to violence will also be held. USAID will provide training and small grants to grassroots civil society organizations to promote community development and will support civil society networks across the country to bolster civil society's collaboration with existing local authorities with the aim of reducing the influence of violent extremism. USAID will target women and youth groups in its programming and will provide support for peace media. Principal contractors and grantees: CARE (prime) and others to be determined.

Activities notified under this strategic objective are part of a new strategy statement that is pending approval. Should funding levels or activities included in this data sheet change substantially once the strategy statement is approved, a new notification will be submitted prior to the obligation of any funds.

**FY 2007 Program**  
**SO: 649-007 Reinforce Conflict-Mitigation Capacity**

**Mitigate Conflict and Support Peace**

Mitigate Conflict and Support Peace (\$100,000 DA). USAID will continue to provide funds to support the UNDP multi-donor Somalia Coordination Secretariat. Principal grantees and contractors: UNDP.

**Strengthen Civil Society**

Strengthen Civil Society (\$1,471,000 DA). USAID will focus on the delivery of and accountability for social and economic development services and build the capacity of community leadership structures to effectively identify and monitor projects. USAID will continue to empower civil society to participate, accountably and transparently, in public decision-making. Institutional and leadership training and small grants to implement community-based development initiatives will be provided. USAID will target women and youth groups in its programming and will also provide support for polio prevention. USAID will strengthen media to emphasize tolerance and the peaceful resolution of conflict. Because of their long and rich oral tradition, Somalis are avid radio listeners, and radio broadcasts are the most effective means of reaching a largely illiterate population. The program will develop effective and broad-reaching radio programming and have a positive impact on promoting peace within Somalia. Principal contractors and grantees: CARE, UNDP (primes) and others to be determined.

**FY 2006 Program**  
**SO: 649-008 Improve Access to Essential Services**

**Achieve Equitable Access to Quality Basic Education**

Achieve Equitable Access to Quality Basic Education (\$945,000 DA). Education in a fragile state such as Somalia is an essential service that provides both short and long-term benefits. In the short-term providing education protects children, provides a stabilizing and positive force for families, and promotes conflict resolution. In the longer term, education equips children with basic skills and attitudes that will lay the foundations for Somalia's social, political and economic development. USAID will implement innovative high quality radio education programs for primary school students and teachers in targeted areas of Somalia. Teacher training, curriculum development and programs to encourage girls to attend school will be undertaken. Principal contractors and grantees: Educational Development Center, Inc. (EDC) (prime).

Activities notified under this strategic objective are part of a new strategy statement that is pending approval. Should funding levels or activities included in this data sheet change substantially once the strategy statement is approved, a new notification will be submitted prior to the obligation of any funds.

**FY 2007 Program**

**SO: 649-008 Improve Access to Essential Services**

**Achieve Equitable Access to Quality Basic Education**

Achieve Equitable Access to Quality Basic Education (\$1,000,000 DA). USAID plans to improve access and quality of basic education through an innovative inter-active radio education program for primary school students and teachers in targeted areas of Somalia. USAID will undertake teacher training, curriculum development and programs to encourage girls to attend school. USAID will also improve access and quality through the rehabilitation of schools in targeted vulnerable communities, including the rehabilitation of water and sanitation facilities at schools. Principal contractors and grantees: Same as FY 2006 and others to be determined.



## **Results Framework**

### **649-004 Strengthened Capacity for Local Governance and Conflict Mitigation**

#### **Program Title: Local Governance and Conflict Mitigation**

IR 4.2: Increased Partnerships among Private sector, Public sector and Civil Society

IR 4.3: Enhanced Institutional Foundation for rule of Law

IR.4.1: Broader More effective Participation of Civil society Organizations in Local Governance

### **649-005 Increased Opportunities for Productive Livelihoods**

#### **Program Title: More Productive Livelihoods**

IR 5.1: Improved Infrastructure and Services for Productive Enterprises

IR 5.2: Economic Targets of Opportunity Exploited

IR 5.3: Increased Productive Areas Where UXOs Are No Longer a Threat

### **649-006 Critical Needs Met for Vulnerable Groups**

#### **Program Title: Humanitarian Assistance**

IR 6.1: Improved Quality and Availability of Health Care Services

IR 6.2: Increased access to Safe Water and Sanitation

IR 6.3: Effective Targeting and Delivery of Food Aid to Vulnerable Groups

IR 6.4: Improved Capacity for Disaster Preparedness and Response

### **649-007 Reinforce Conflict-Mitigation Capacity**

#### **Program Title: Reinforce Conflict-Mitigation Capacity**

7.1: Strengthen civil society to promote peace, social and economic development and democratic governance

7.2: Strengthen the capacity of media to contribute to peace and good governance

### **649-008 Improve Access to Essential Services**

#### **Program Title: Improve Access to Essential Services**

8.1: Improved access to quality basic education

8.2: Effective targeting and delivery of emergency assistance